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Following the stagnation of negotiations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific states, the 
centrepiece of the European Union’s (EU’s) trade and development strategy has been a 
reform of the Generalised System of Preferences. Although policymakers in the 
Commission’s Directorate-General for Trade have argued they are ‘refocusing’ these 
preferences on the ‘neediest’, by rendering a significant proportion of emerging economies’ 
exports ineligible for the scheme, this article argues that the reform is actually part of a 
broader ‘reciprocity’ agenda being pursued in the context of the current economic crisis. This 
is about ensuring the EU possesses sufficient offensive leverage in on-going free trade 
agreement negotiations, rather than representing any mercantilist move towards greater 
domestic protection. In arguing that the EU’s developmental trade agenda is increasingly 
subordinated to commercial imperatives, this article adds to a literature that has situated the 
study of EU trade and development policy within the field of political economy. 
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Introduction 
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The European Union (EU) is the world’s single largest market for goods from developing 
countries (Woolcock 2012, p. 149), with imports totaling 845 billion euro in 2012 (Eurostat 
2013). As a result, the decision to introduce a series of changes to its Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP) has significant global consequences. Originally authorised by a meeting of 
the contracting parties of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1968, GSP 
was seen as the key component of the ‘special and differential treatment’ offered to 
developing countries in the context of calls for a New International Economic Order (see 
White 1975, pp. 547-8, Whalley 1990, pp. 1319-21). By way of derogation from the Most-
Favoured-Nation (MFN) principle – authorised by the 1979 Enabling Clause of the GATT – 
the idea was for developed economies to (unilaterally) offer preferential duty rates to any 
developing country in order to assist in their development. In the case of the EU, however, 
GSP has not lived up to its full potential because it was seen as secondary to the scheme of 
preferences for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states under the Lomé Conventions 
(Heron 2013, Ch. 2). In this vein, the EU’s recent self-professed attempts to ‘refocus’ GSP 
preferences ‘on those countries most in need’ (Commission 2012, p. 2) – while its 
negotiations with ACP countries on a successor arrangement to Lomé have stagnated – can 
be read as a rebalancing of the EU’s priorities in the direction of GSP.  
 
That being said, in this article I challenge the view that these changes (which kick in from 
January 2014) represent a boon for developing countries. Under the GSP reform all high- and 
upper-middle-income countries will lose eligibility for preferences, while a whole host of 
products (mostly from emerging economies) will also be graduated (i.e. no longer eligible for 
preferential treatment). Although the European Commission’s Directorate General (DG) for 
Trade has justified these changes in terms of providing the poorest (Least Developed 
Countries [LDCs] and so-called ‘vulnerable’ economies) with the space to develop their 
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export markets, the fact remains that the alleged benefits for these economies are far from 
certain. What is more, it is rather odd that the Commission is seeking to develop a model of 
poverty-reduction based on non-reciprocal trade preferences when it chose to abandon such a 
model in the case of the ACP group in favour of reciprocal trade deals, the so-called 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) (see en. 7). Although the idea of ‘differentiating’ 
between developing countries is not entirely new to EU trade policy, the lack of a coherent 
development rationale for the recent GSP reform begs two important questions. Firstly, what 
is driving these changes to the scheme and, secondly, what does this reform say about the 
broader ‘trade-development’ nexus in EU policy that authors have begun explicitly writing 
about (e.g. Young and Peterson 2013)?  
 
In response to the first question, I situate the GSP reform within the broader crisis landscape, 
where policymakers in DG Trade are increasingly concerned with showing that trade 
(liberalisation) ‘works’. In this vein, their policy discourse of late has been rife with an 
emphasis on ‘reciprocity’. This may seem at first like a turn to mercantilism (understood here 
as a concern with maximising net exports) and consequently also the interests of 
protectionists. However, a closer reading of EU policy as well as interviews with 
Commission officials and interest group representatives1 suggest that the references to 
reciprocity actually betray a strong desire to enhance the EU’s trade negotiating leverage. I 
interpret the GSP reform as just one (albeit significant) attempt to recapture lost leverage with 
emerging economies with which the EU has been negotiating flagship free trade gareements 
(FTAs) following the 2006 Global Europe communication. 
 
This finding naturally raises broader implications for the study of the ‘trade-development’ 
nexus; the GSP reform appears to be driven by commercial interests to which developmental 
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considerations have been subordinated. As a result, one of the broader contributions of this 
article is to challenge the idea of a uniquely ‘normative power Europe’ intent on exporting its 
progressive values and which acts in a development-friendly fashion (e.g. Manners 2008). 
Indeed, and echoing the sentiments of this literature, policymakers have been keen to stress 
the differences between supposedly ‘developmental’ and ‘commercial’ trade policymaking, 
where agreements of the former type (e.g. with the ACP) are said to be driven by distinct 
imperatives when compared to agreements of the latter type (say with emerging markets) 
(e.g. Commission 2009, p. 1). Such views have also been implicitly supported by the 
scholarly literature on the trade-development nexus; this has tended to focus on institutional 
conflicts between bureaucracies within the Commission – especially between DG Trade and 
DG Development – which allegedly embody these distinct imperatives (see Holland and 
Doidge 2012).  
 
In contrast, I argue that there is evidence to suggest that the EU’s external economic 
diplomacy is not much unlike that of its allegedly more hard-nosed rivals (e.g. the United 
States or China). In doing so, I align myself with a number of authors who have sought to 
move beyond the institutional determinants of EU external policymaking and begun to situate 
its study within the wider discipline of political economy (see De Bièvre and Poletti 2013). 
What has mattered to such scholars in particular, following a voluminous literature in the 
field, is how the balance of domestic-societal interests is an important determinant of trade 
policy outcomes, with exporters seen as key drivers of the EU’s offensive trade agenda 
embodied by Global Europe (Heron and Siles-Brügge 2012).2 In this article, I also find that 
the influence of political economic interests has been an important determinant of the GSP 
reform, with exporters being key drivers of the EU’s recent leverage agenda. Indeed, the 
notion of ‘reciprocity’ is understood to be a key underlying feature in the political economy 
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literature on international trade negotiations, often seen as necessary to mobilise exporters in 
favour of trade liberalisation and thus offset protectionist interests (e.g. Gilligan, 1997). 
 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. In the next section I provide an overview 
of the evolution of EU trade and development policy since the start of the crisis, before 
discussing the specifics of the GSP reform. The third section challenges the Commission’s 
rationale for the reform, arguing that the new regulation has to be interpreted as a move to 
subordinate developmental policy objectives to the needs of enhancing trade-negotiating 
leverage. The fourth section then turns to the interest group politics behind the drafting and 
approval of the GSP reform, finding that the views of exporters were privileged over those of 
importers, import-competing sectors and development-minded Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs). The final section concludes, offering some thoughts on the exposure 
of EU development policy to commercial imperatives. 
 
EU trade and development policy since the start of the crisis: reforming the GSP 
scheme3 
Since the start of the crisis, there has been a move towards consolidating the EU’s offensive 
FTA agenda. This had been initiated earlier – in the context of the stagnation of the Doha 
Round of multilateral trade talks – by the 2006 Global Europe communication written under 
Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson. Specifically, Global Europe argued for the need to 
target the emerging economies of South and East Asia and led to the initiation of FTA talks 
with these countries (Commission 2006).4 In this vein, the Trade, Growth and World Affairs 
strategy – which replaces Global Europe as the guiding document for EU trade policy and 
was authored under the leadership of Karel De Gucht, who took over as Trade Commissioner 
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in February 2010 – has stuck to the ambitious liberalisation agenda set back in 2006 
(Commission 2010c).  
 
The only variation in the new communication with respect to Global Europe was the latter’s 
emphasis on ‘reciprocity’. The argument was that ‘for an open trade policy in Europe to 
succeed politically, others – including both our developed and emerging partners – must 
match our efforts, in a spirit of reciprocity and mutual benefit’ (Commission 2010d, p. 4). 
The reference to reciprocity, however, betrays a concern with ensuring the EU possesses 
sufficient leverage in on-going trade negotiations, rather than representing any mercantilist 
move towards greater domestic protection as some may have concluded (see De Ville and 
Orbie 2013). The problem from DG Trade’s perspective is that there is now even more 
pressure to deliver tangible liberalisation gains (for exporters) to boost growth and counter 
protectionist sentiment, but fewer negotiating chips to accomplish this with, especially vis-à-
vis emerging economies; the EU’s market is perceived to be less attractive due to 
comparatively lower rates of growth and it is already largely open to the world – with the 
obvious exception of agriculture where the EU has little room to negotiate trade concessions 
(Young 2011, p. 726, Siles-Brügge 2014, Ch. 6). Moreover, given the increasing 
macroeconomic policy constraints imposed by austerity packages within the EU, De Gucht 
(2013, p. 3) has eagerly noted that trade liberalisation ‘is the cheapest stimulus package you 
can imagine’. 
 
In this context the Commission announced a new trade and development strategy in January 
2012. The aim of Trade, Growth and Development: Tailoring Trade and Investment Policy 
for Those Countries Most in Need was to ‘propose[…] concrete ways to enhance synergies 
between trade and development policies’ (Commission 2012, p. 2, emphasis omitted). 
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Crucially the communication ‘stresse[d] the need to increasingly differentiate among 
developing countries to focus on those most in need’ (Commission 2012, p. 2), with trade 
preferences seen as a crucial instrument in the fight against poverty. This is, of course, not an 
entirely new sentiment. Differentiation between developing countries in the area of trade has 
featured prominently in the EU’s policy discourse for a number of years, particularly in the 
context of the Doha Round (see Woolcock this issue). The communication, however, has not 
only reiterated this point, but rather taken it beyond any previous initiatives: the 
communication’s flagship policy announcement – a proposal for a reformed GSP scheme – 
appears to offer the prospect of differentiation without a particularly coherent developmental 
rationale. This is a point I return to below, after having considered the design of this new 
regulation. 
 
‘Income’ and ‘product’ graduation 
The new GSP regulation was adopted in October 2012 and is due to enter into force in 
January 2014. It largely reflects the Commission’s original proposal from May 2011 
(Commission 2011a), introducing three key changes with respect to the previous scheme (for 
details on the minor changes introduced by the European Parliament [EP] and Council of 
Ministers, see the fourth section below). Firstly, the Commission successfully changed the 
eligibility criteria for GSP so that all high income and upper-middle-income countries – in 
other words, those which meet the appropriate World Bank definitional criteria for the most 
recent three consecutive years – are no longer entitled to preferences (this is referred to as 
‘income graduation’ in a study from the Overseas Development Institute ODI 2011). 
Secondly, it would also remove those countries and territories with a trade agreement with 
the EU ‘which provides the same tariff preferences as the scheme, or better, for substantially 
all trade’ from the list of beneficiaries of the scheme (Regulation [EU] No 978/2012, Article 
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4). According to the Commission these changes reduce the pool of eligible countries and 
territories from 177 (in essence almost all countries or territories self-classifying under WTO 
rules as ‘developing’) to 90 (Commission 2013, p. 4).  
 
The final key innovation is a series of changes to the graduation principle for GSP imports. 
Under the old regulation, products were grouped into 21 so-called ‘sections’ (or groups of 
products). If any country’s exports under GSP for a particular product section exceeded the 
so-called ‘graduation threshold’ – 15 per cent of the total EU GSP imports for a particular 
section (12.5 per cent for textiles) – they were no longer eligible for GSP (on the basis that 
such products were competitive enough to establish a foothold in the EU market). In this 
respect, the new GSP regulation makes it easier for products to be graduated (‘product 
graduation’, again to use the term from ODI 2011) for two reasons. Firstly, even though the 
relevant threshold values will be increased to 17.5 per cent and 14.5 per cent for textiles, the 
number of product categories will expand to 32 (meaning smaller categories). Secondly, the 
value of total imports used to calculate market share (the so-called ‘denominator’) will 
decrease given the significant reduction in the number GSP beneficiaries. As a result of the 
increased ease with which imports could therefore surpass thresholds, 5.3 billion euro worth 
of trade (2009 data) – spread among six countries (China, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Thailand 
and Ukraine) – was originally estimated by the Commission to no longer be eligible for GSP 
treatment (Commission 2011a: 115). The tariff lines on which these estimates were based 
quite closely corresponded to the first list of products graduated under the new regulation (for 
the years 2014-2016) (Commission Implementing Regulation [EU] No. 1213/2012). 
Moreover, an ODI study from 2011 found that there was significant potential for an 
additional two countries (Iraq and Vietnam) to lose preferences from product graduation 
(ODI 2011, p. 7). 
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Interrogating the Commission’s rationale: the GSP changes as an instrument of 
leverage5 
As noted in the framing communication on Trade, Growth and Development, the 
Commission and its officials have maintained that the reform is intended to ‘focus the GSP 
preferences on the countries most in need’ (Commission 2011a, p. 2). These are, in their eyes, 
LDCs and so-called ‘vulnerable economies’ (those lacking product diversification and being 
poorly integrated into the world economy; see Commission 2011b, p. 11), the respective 
recipients of the ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) and GSP+ schemes.6 Based on the analysis of 
a study it had commissioned, the Commission has argued that the main beneficiaries of GSP 
were in fact emerging economies with increasingly competitive sectors, at the expense of 
countries in greater need of preferences (Commission 2011b, pp. 11-13). New eligibility 
criteria were needed so that GSP preferences could be targeted on poorer countries, while the 
new graduation mechanism would serve to ‘weed out the more competitive product sections’ 
among those economies that remained eligible for the scheme (Commission 2011b, p. 24).  
 
There are, however, significant reasons for doubting the Commission’s stated rationale. 
Firstly, it would be using the tools of a development model premised on non-reciprocal 
preferences which it has explicitly rejected since the 1996 Green Paper on EU-ACP relations 
(Commission 1996). This brought to an end the era of one-way trade preferences under Lomé 
and laid the foundations for the Commission’s current agenda of EPAs.7 Not only is the 
Commission trying to sign EPAs with LDCs already in receipt of EBA (albeit unsurprisingly 
without much success) but, similarly, out of fourteen GSP+ recipients it has signed FTAs 
with eight – Peru, Columbia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama – and has previously also sought an agreement with two others (Bolivia and 
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Ecuador) before talks broke down. Thus, the Commission’s claim that it is aiming to improve 
the value of non-reciprocal preferences for those ‘most in need’ – LDCs and ‘vulnerable 
economies’ in receipt of GSP+ – is not entirely consistent with its general preference for 
contractually-enshrined free trade.8 
 
A second challenge to the Commission’s development-based argument can be found in the 
aforementioned ODI report on the GSP changes. This argues that ‘[p]roduct and income 
graduation [as found in the new regulation] is not an effective way of helping poor, 
uncompetitive states’ (ODI 2011, p. iii). Firstly, it finds that many of the goods for which 
there will be graduation are not ones that lower-income countries export. Moreover, even if a 
lower-income country does export an affected product, the preference margin afforded by 
GSP may be insufficient to counter a graduating country’s existing export competitiveness. 
Finally, even where the preference margins are significant, other, higher income countries are 
likely to be the biggest beneficiaries of the GSP changes. The report finds that even for 
products where poorer countries account for at least 5 per cent of EU imports – products in 
which such states could potentially establish a foothold in the EU market and which could 
thus contribute to poverty reduction – high-income and upper-middle income countries 
currently account for almost two-thirds of EU imports (ODI 2011, pp. 12-13). Very similar 
findings are echoed in another recent study of the GSP scheme undertaken by the Centre for 
the Analysis of Regional Integration at Sussex (CARIS) (Gasiorek et al. 2010, p. 8). 
Although this does not rule out any beneficial effects for lower-income countries, and is 
based on static analysis that neglects potential dynamic effects of changing export patterns 
(as noted by one Commission official) – it does suggest that large-scale benefits of the GSP 
proposals for this group of states are far from certain, in contrast to more predictable gains 
from trade diversion for higher-income countries. In this vein, the CARIS study of the GSP 
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scheme found that ‘there is little evidence that the EU’s preference regimes have led to a 
diversification of exports into new products’ (Gasiorek et al. 2010, p. 8). More generally, EU 
preference schemes (such as EBA) have been criticised precisely because LDCs (in 
particular) lack the ‘governance’ and ‘economic’ ‘capacity’ to exploit them (Faber and Orbie 
2009, p. 769). 
 
As a result, I argue that these changes to the supposedly ‘developmental’ side of EU trade 
policy have to be situated within the wider context of the EU’s commercial trade policy – 
where they are more likely to have a discernible impact than in contributing to poverty-
reduction. More specifically, the reform of GSP has to be seen as part of the move towards 
improving leverage in on-going trade negotiations as a means of delivering on the Global 
Europe objectives of access to emerging country markets. Indeed, the impact of the changes 
will be most strongly be felt by the FTA partners identified in the Global Europe 
communication that the EU is currently negotiating with or seeking to open talks with. This is 
unsurprising if we consider that in 2008 these countries accounted for seven of the top eleven 
sources of GSP imports to the EU (Commission 2010a). They are listed below in Table 1.  
 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
 
It becomes clear from this that the exports of many of the EU’s Global Europe FTA partners 
are significantly and negatively affected by the new regulation. Table 1 shows that the most 
significant ‘income graduated’ Global Europe FTA partners, which will be completely 
excluded from the scheme, stand to lose preferences on a significant proportion of their total 
exports: the ODI study’s estimates (based on average trade data from 2008-2010) suggest that 
it could be as much as 7.31 per cent in the case of Argentina; 8.96 per cent in the case of 
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Brazil and 12.2 per cent in the case of Malaysia. The same may be said of ‘product 
graduation’ for those who remain within GSP. India, for example, is estimated to lose 
preferences on 2.37 per cent of its total exports and Vietnam on 4.13 per cent (see Table 1). 
Moreover, these changes potentially affect exports that would have benefitted substantially 
from GSP. In India’s case, the ODI study estimated that almost half (44.8 per cent) face MFN 
tariffs of 5 per cent or more, while the equivalent figures are 27.6 per cent for Thailand and a 
whopping 76.1 for Vietnam (ODI 2011, p. 10; see also Table 1)! In sum, the countries and 
products likely to be excluded from GSP are consistent with the objective of boosting the 
EU’s leverage as they significantly impact on the exports of emerging economies the EU is 
currently negotiating FTAs with (e.g. India and a number of ASEAN Member States). In 
contrast, the GSP reform’s relatively small impact on EU imports suggests that the reform 
has less to do with protecting EU producers (more on which in the following section). For 
most of the countries depicted in Table 1 (which provides data on almost all of the top GSP 
exporters to the EU), affected GSP imports represented less than 1 per cent of total EU 
imports – including for that persistent bugbear of import-competing sectors, China. 
Moreover, in all cases affected GSP trade accounted for a more significant proportion of a 
trading partner’s exports than of EU imports.  
 
In assessing the GSP changes, DG Trade emphasised that these ‘ha[d] nothing to do with 
other [commercial] trade negotiations’. On the same page, however, it also noted that they 
‘might still have the unintended consequence of providing more advanced developing 
countries with a greater incentive to enter into and conclude reciprocal trade negotiations 
with the EU’ (Commission 2011b, p. 15). In this respect DG Trade has consistently singled 
out India (whose exports, as I noted above, rely heavily on GSP and which stands to lose 
considerably from graduation); the concern is that while it ‘enjoys relatively good market 
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access for goods to the EU under the GSP […] [it also] maintains fairly high tariffs and some 
peaks in areas particularly important to EU industry (such as cars, wines and spirits) and 
significant non-tariff barriers in other sectors important to EU exporters’ (Commission 
2010d, p. 8).  
 
By scrapping or limiting preferences for emerging economies the Commission hopes to put 
free trade on a contractual (and reciprocal) footing with such countries – as De Gucht (2011, 
p. 2) explicitly recognised in a speech launching the proposals in May 2011. This sentiment 
also informed the specific proposal to scrap GSP for those in receipt of preferences under an 
FTA. As illustratively noted by a Commission official, there are no countries that stand to 
lose GSP that are not already in advanced FTA negotiations with the EU; the crux of their 
argument was that such countries therefore had the option of maintaining their access to the 
EU market. In this vein, the press has reported the EU’s Ambassador to Thailand lobbying 
that government to start FTA negotiations in the light of the GSP reform (Pratruangkrai 
2012). This strategy, moreover, has also begun to bear fruits. Several sources have since 
noted that the reform has been a key factor in driving Thailand to agree to start FTA 
negotiations with the EU in March 2013 (the EU’s GSP scheme covered 3.58 per cent of 
Thailand’s total exports), with Thai policymakers allegedly keen to complete the trade talks 
before GSP preferences run out (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2013). 
 
What about protectionists? The interest group politics of the reform9 
Having provided an overview of the GSP changes and shown how they serve the objective of 
enhancing the EU’s negotiating leverage, my aim in this section is to provide an overview of 
the interest group politics behind the reform. I argue that this not only played an important 
role in shaping the initial Commission proposal and final regulation, but also helps to 
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underscore my argument that this is about EU leverage rather than protectionism. While my 
findings in the previous section suggest that the GSP reform will have a greater impact on 
emerging countries’ exports than EU imports (accounting for a far more significant share of 
the former), the fact remains that the GSP reform still restricts imports. According to some 
this can be seen to indicate the growing influence of protectionists in trade policy following 
the Financial Crisis (e.g. Nowakowska 2010). The reduction of preference margins for some 
products of interest to retailers and other importers – such as textiles and clothing (see 
Gasiorek et al. 2010, p. 8) – could, in particular, be said to be a sign of the marginalisation of 
such groups at the expense of protectionists, as has happened on other occasions in the EU 
(De Bièvre and Eckhardt 2011). In contrast, I find that while importers may well have been 
marginalised, the new regulation reflects, to a large extent, the interests of exporters rather 
than protectionists. 
 
Exporters made their views most apparent to the Commission during a stakeholder 
consultation exercise held from March to May 2010. The main concern for such businesses 
was the issue of leverage in negotiations, particularly with India (which, as became apparent 
above, was also the bugbear of DG Trade officials). As one such organisation representing 
pan-European business interests was to note: ‘GSP undermines the EU’s negotiating position 
in bilateral and especially multilateral trade negotiations because partners already have 
preferential access to the EU market or they are concerned about preference erosion’ 
(Commission 2010b, p. 4). More broadly, exporters consistently stressed two things during 
this consultation. Firstly, they underscored the need to restrict eligibility by excluding higher 
(and even, in some cases, middle-income countries) from the scheme and, secondly, they 
requested facilitating the graduation of imports by allowing for the graduation of individual 
products (see Table 2). Although the Commission’s initial proposal and the regulation were 
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slightly more moderate than this – excluding only high-income and higher-middle-income 
countries and increasing the number of product sections rather than allowing for individual 
product graduation – exporting interests expressed surprise in interviews at the degree to 
which their requests were reproduced in the Commission’s proposal. Moreover, the 
Commission appears to have privileged their views over the wishes not only of importers (in 
particular retailers) and European development NGOs but also import-competing interests 
(notably textile, clothing and leather producers, which were particularly sensitive given the 
significance of preference margins under GSP, see Gasiorek et al. 2010, p. 8). Their requests 
for, respectively, a more open (and less variable) scheme; a maintenance of the existing 
system and a very restrictive (and extremely responsive) graduation were not significantly 
reflected in the Commission proposal. As a result, and in contrast to exporters, import-
competing sectors and importers were not completely satisfied with the Commission’s May 
2011 proposals – even if they were inclined to see, respectively, the benefits of the proposed 
regulation in terms of restricting imports and providing for greater simplicity and 
predictability in the EU’s import regime. NGOs, for their part, were generally dissatisfied 
with a regulation they saw as undermining poverty reduction efforts (see Table 2).  
 
[insert Table 2 about here] 
 
It is naturally difficult to determine to what extent exporters are responsible for the content of 
the Commission proposal, beyond highlighting the similarity of their requests to the final 
regulation. There is, however, additional evidence to suggest that their influence was not 
negligible. Firstly, the views of the Commission appeared to shift after its 2010 consultation 
of business groups. Indeed, if we examine the previous state of Commission thinking on the 
matter under both Peter Mandelson and Pascal Lamy, we find an interesting contrast to the 
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current reform. Although the Commission was proposing back in July 2004 to amend the 
GSP regulation to better ‘[t]arget the GSP on the countries that most need it’, and doing so by 
tinkering with product graduation (Commission 2004, p. 7) it also wanted to avoid graduating 
entire sections on the basis of only a few products (Commission 2004, p. 9). The ‘substance’ 
of the 2005 GSP scheme that came out of these proposals was not altered with the 2008 GSP 
scheme (Commission 2007, p. 3) but was clearly quite different to the emphasis placed in the 
most recent reform on creating a greater number of product sections. Indeed, the Commission 
– echoing the views of business on the matter (Commission 2010b) – highlighted that under 
the previous system ‘graduation has been barely used’ and was therefore ‘insufficiently 
responsive’ to the competitiveness of product sections. This, it said, justified the more 
disaggregated approach to graduation taken in the latest reform (Commission 2011b, p. 16). 
Similarly, while earlier GSP schemes had practised some income graduation this only applied 
to high income countries that were ‘sufficiently diversified in their exports’ (i.e. where the 
top five GSP sections accounted for less than 75 per cent of total GSP exports), leaving 
several such states (as well as all upper middle income countries) on the GSP beneficiary list 
(Council Regulation [EC] No. 980/2005, Council Regulation [EC] No. 732/2008).10 Although 
this does suggest that the idea of graduation in the context of GSP is not entirely novel – as I 
have noted above – it also points to the fact that, following the lobbying efforts of exporters, 
it has taken on an entirely new dimension. 
 
When it came to lobbying the Council and EP over approval of the Commission’s proposed 
changes to the GSP scheme, the impact of those groups that had been dissatisfied with the 
Commission’s initial proposal was also minor. Both the Council and the EP were generally 
quite favourably-inclined to the proposed changes in terms of ‘income’ and ‘product’ 
graduation (see EP 2012a, pp. 31-3, Council 2012, p. 3). Where revisions were sought by 
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these two bodies these did not challenge either of these features of the original Commission 
proposal.11 Although one amendment postponed its initial application until 2014 – and 
another included a transitional period for those countries having initialled but not yet ratified 
an FTA with the EU by November 2012 to prevent them from losing their market access 
under GSP – this can be hardly be seen as a major concession to the interests of importers in 
facilitating market access under GSP. Much the same can be said for NGOs and the very 
modest increase in product coverage for GSP introduced by the EP and Council on 
developmental grounds. Import-competing interests appear, at first sight, to have been more 
successful. In line with their wishes, the regulation was amended to extend the special 
safeguards to include all textiles (and not just clothing); lower the threshold for this special 
safeguard and more generally strengthen safeguard provisions (on all these changes, see EP 
2012a, Council 2012, Regulation [EU] No 978/2012).12 It should be remembered, 
nevertheless, that safeguard clauses are rarely used by the EU given more burdensome 
requirements in establishing injury when compared to anti-dumping (Siles-Brügge 2014, Ch. 
4). 
 
Notwithstanding their relatively minor impact, these amendments broadly satisfied 
protectionist interests in the Council and EP – as well as those concerned about the 
‘predictability’ of EU market access arrangements for importers and the developmental 
impact of the regulation (EP 2012b). The amended regulation was therefore approved without 
much controversy at a ‘first reading’ of the EP in June 2012 and subsequently by Member 
States in October (d’Imécourt 2012). It is consequently fair to say that the lack of serious 
opposition from protectionists (or indeed importers and NGOs) was a factor in facilitating the 
relatively smooth passage of the proposed legislation through the Council and the EP – 
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although the content ultimately reflected a concern with accommodating the interests of 
exporters. 
 
Conclusion 
My aim in this article has been to situate the EU’s supposedly ‘developmental’ trade policy in 
the case of the GSP reform within the wider context of its exporter-driven trade agenda. The 
reform, although justified in developmental terms as an effort to improve the value of 
preferences for the ‘neediest’, is in fact part of the effort to improve the EU’s leverage in 
negotiations with emerging economies. In support of this argument I showed how the 
supposed benefits of ‘income’ and ‘product’ graduation for the ‘intended’ LDCs and 
‘vulnerable’ economies are far from certain. Moreover, the ‘targeting’ of non-reciprocal trade 
preferences (and indeed their broader reinvigoration) as an instrument of poverty-reduction is 
not entirely consistent with the move away from non-reciprocity in the EU’s other trade 
relations with developing economies – where FTAs are seen as the preferred option by 
Commission policymakers. In contrast, the GSP reform has a noticeable impact on the 
exports of emerging economies the EU is currently negotiating FTAs with. Similarly, rather 
than representing a move towards greater protection at a  time of economic crisis, the GSP 
changes will have little impact on total EU imports, with policymakers in DG Trade 
ultimately being more sympathetic to the arguments of exporters than import-competitors (or 
indeed any other lobbyists).  
 
Taken more broadly, my empirical findings challenge the common EU policymaker narrative 
that trade and development policy are driven by distinct imperatives or that the EU is a 
uniquely ‘normative power’ (see Manners 2008). Rather, I have shown that the political 
economic forces shaping trade policies in other entities play an important role in the EU as 
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well, adding to a literature which seeks to situate the study of EU external economic 
diplomacy within the wider political economy of trade (which has long been attuned to 
‘reciprocity’ as a tool for serving exporters and offsetting protectionist pressures). In a short 
article such as this there is of course no space to fully explore the implications of such a 
development – but it does raise questions as to the desirability of the current trade-
development nexus. If the EU’s primary concern in trade policy is to establish liberal markets 
which its firms can compete in to what extent can it contribute to the economic development 
of developing countries, for which it is the most important global provider of market access? 
The GSP reform suggests that both objectives are not necessarily compatible as it serves the 
former much more clearly than the latter. It is thus a stark reminder of the problems 
associated with the entwinement of commercial and developmental trade policy already 
brought to the fore by the previous controversy surrounding the EPA negotiations, where 
critics accused the EU of restricting the policy space available to ACP countries (e.g. Hurt 
2003, Langan this issue). 
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1 Seven interviews were conducted in Brussels in May 2011 and January 2013. These have been anonymised at 
the request of the interviewees. 
2 There is also an important ideational dimension in that the Commission subscribes to a neoliberal paradigm in 
trade that leads it to privilege exporter interests over other considerations. While consistent with my arguments 
here, a more detailed discussion of this dynamic is unfortunately beyond the more narrow scope of this article 
(see instead Siles-Brügge, 2014). 
3 In this sub-section, I draw on interviews with Commission officials, 17 and 25 May 2011 and 25 January 2013. 
4 As a result, the EU has signed FTAs with Korea and Singapore and is currently negotiating with India and 
some of the members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). It has also re-launched talks 
(originally initiated in 1999) with the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR).  
5 In this section I draw on interviews with Commission officials, 25 May 2011 and 25 January 2013. 
6 GSP+ provides additional market access in addition to GSP to a series of countries qualifying as ‘vulnerable’, 
provided they sign up to a series of conventions on core human and labour rights, the environment and other 
‘good governance standards’. Under the new GSP regulation, recipients of GSP+ will not be subject to product 
graduation. Under EBA, the EU offers LDCs ‘duty-free, quota-free’ access to its market for almost all goods. 
7 Although the EU was under WTO pressure to reform its scheme of non-reciprocal trade preferences vis-à-vis 
the ACP, there is evidence to suggest that the EU could have done more to resist this should it have wanted to 
(see Hurt 2003). 
8 In this vein, while the 2001 EBA initiative may have institutionalised non-reciprocal preferences for LDCs, it 
has also been referred to as “‘Everything But Development”’; whereas its developmental impact has been 
modest it has been ‘instrumental for some EU policy actors to steer’ the EU into a more ‘globalist-liberal’ 
direction, among other things helping to reshape EU-ACP relations (undermining the cohesion of the ACP 
group) and winning over developing and developed countries to the EU position in the Doha Round (Faber and 
Orbie 2009, pp. 778-84). 
9 In this section I draw on interviews with interest group representatives, 20 and 26 May and 22 January 2013. 
10 Similarly, while these earlier schemes also featured provisions for removing economies if they had an 
agreement with the EU offering equivalent market access to GSP, many states with preferential trading 
arrangements had remained on the list of beneficiaries (in contrast to the situation under the new regulation). 
11 I should note at this juncture that the GSP reform proposals were also drafted with the need to balance 
Member State interests in mind (and to a lesser extent also Members of the EP). Discussing this is unfortunately 
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beyond the scope of this article, which seeks to interrogate the underlying reason for the reform (which was 
initiated by the Commission and driven by its concern for exporter interests). 
12 The final substantive change pushed for by the EP and Council was a limited duration of 10 years for the new 
regulation. The Commission had wanted it to be open-ended.  
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Table 1 – The likely effects of the reform on the top GSP exporters* to the EU: enhancing the EU’s negotiating leverage 
 
 
 
Net graduation of GSP imports 
from partner as a 
 percentage of total EU imports 
(2008-2010 average)** 
Net graduation of GSP 
exports to EU as a 
percentage of partner’s 
total exports (2008-
2010 average)** 
Product (P) or 
Income (I) 
graduation? 
Percentage of 
affected GSP 
exports facing 
MFN tariffs 
>5%** 
Global Europe 
trading partner 
 
Status of FTA 
talks with EU 
      
India In progress 0.29% 2.37%  P  44.8% 
      
ASEAN Suspended     
Indonesia Sought by EU 0.06% 0.88% P  25.7% 
Malaysia In progress 1.15% 12.2% I  11.6% 
Thailand In progress 0.03% 0.36% P 27.6% 
Vietnam In progress 0.13% 4.13% P 76.1% 
      
Mercosur In progress     
Argentina As part of Mercosur 0.26% 7.31% I 23.1% 
Brazil As part of Mercosur 0.89% 8.96% I 11.2% 
      
      
Other major 
GSP exporters         
      
China N/A 0.21% 0.29%      P 26.7% 
Russia N/A 8.31% 45.5%      I N/A 
Ukraine N/A 0.06% 1.86%      P 0.2% 
      
Sources: Eurostat (2013), IMF (2013), ODI (2011).  
Notes:*Top 11 GSP exporters to the EU in 2008, excluding Saudi Arabia (for which data was deficient). **Calculated from ODI estimates. 
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Table 2 – Interest group requests for reform of the GSP 
Sources: Commission (2010b); BUSINESSEUROPE (2011); EURATEX (2012); EuroCommerce (2010); Foreign Trade Association (2010); CONCORD (2011); Quick and 
Schmülling (2011). 
 Exporters Import-competitors Importers Development NGOs 
Key groups (EU-
level ‘sector’ and 
‘cross-sectoral’ 
organisations; 
Greenwood 2011, 
pp. 75-92, 131) 
BUSINESSEUROPE (cross-sectoral, 
representing national business 
federations from across Europe; 
broadly represents exporter interests, 
see Siles-Brügge 2014, Ch. 3) 
The European Apparel and Textile 
Confederation (EURATEX) and the 
Confederation of National 
Associations of Tanners and 
Dressers of the European 
Community (COTANCE)   
EuroCommerce (representing national 
federations of retailers and wholesalers); 
the Foreign Trade Association (representing 
assorted retailers and importers) and the 
European Branded Clothing Alliance 
European Confederation of Relief 
and Development NGOs 
(CONCORD) 
 
Summary of 
requests (largely 
derived from 
submissions to the 
consultation and 
groups’ position 
papers) 
1. Exclude high- (and, at times, 
middle-) income countries from 
scheme. 
2. Graduate individual product 
lines. 
(Commission 2010b, pp. 4, 9-12, 18-
20, 86, 147, 157, 204, 207-10, 
BUSINESSEUROPE 2011,  Quick 
and Schmülling 2011) 
1. Extend the sectors to be 
covered by special safeguards. 
2. Institute an extremely rapid 
withdrawal of GSP benefits.  
3. A product graduation criterion 
based on global rather than EU 
market share. 
(Commission 2010b, pp. 12, 164, 
211, EURATEX 2012: 16) 
1. Maintain the two-tiered system of 
classifying developing countries 
(developing and ‘least developed’). 
2. Higher thresholds for product 
graduation (especially for textiles and 
clothing). 
3. Decrease the frequency of graduation. 
(Commission 2010b, pp. 184, 217, 227, 
234, EuroCommerce 2010, p. 2, Foreign 
Trade Association 2010, pp. 2-3) 
1. Maintain the existing system 
of unilateral preferences.  
2. Focus on the developmental 
impact of preferences. 
(Commission 2010b, pp. 34, 49, 
52, 57, 96-7). 
 
Are the groups 
satisfied with the 
Commission’s 
initial (May 2010) 
proposals? 
Yes. Illustrative example: 
‘BUSINESSEUROPE has welcomed 
the European Commission proposal 
[...]’ (BUSINESSEUROPE 2011, p. 
1) 
 
Only partly.  Illustrative example: 
EURATEX (2012, p. 16) sees the 
‘reduction in the beneficiary 
countries’ as ‘positive’, but is 
worried about the lack of 
graduation in GSP+. 
 
Only partly.  Illustrative example: 
‘[The proposal’s] main elements maintain 
the improvements made to the GSP in the 
past decade: no more annual graduation, 
simpler product classification, only one 
special incentive regime (GSP+), and 
enough time for importers to prepare’ but 
the new system needs to ‘[f]ocus on its 
target group’ of ‘importers’ 
(EuroCommerce 2011, p. 1). 
No.  Illustrative example: 
CONCORD (2011, p. 1) ‘is 
particularly concerned by the 
proposed new eligibility criteria 
which will see more than half of 
current GSP beneficiaries 
removed. […] CONCORD 
believes that it will […] 
undermine progress towards 
poverty reduction through trade.’ 
